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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN MISSOURI*
JOHN S. DIVILBISS**
I. PLEADING
A. Motion for More Definite Statement
Rule 55.06 of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
petition contain "a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . ..."
After the 1943 Code of Civil Procedure was written, Judges Hyde
and Douglas pointed out that the Missouri rule "requires a more definite
statement of a claim than the corresponding Federal rule" and that a
motion for a more definite statement should be granted to require a pleader
"to clearly define the issues to be met." When issues are thus defined "a
party is guided in his preparation for trial and may protect himself against
surprise."'
Both before and after the 1943 Code the Missouri courts have held
that a plaintiff who alleges general negligence in other than a res ipsa
loquitur case will be required to make his petition more definite if defendant
so demands.2
In.December 1960, the Kansas City Court of Appeals reaffirmed this
principle saying:
It cannot be denied that a motion to make a petition more
definite and certain should be sustained where the petition pleads
general negligence, and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not
apply."
One month later division two of the Supreme Court cast some doubt
on this proposition.
*This article contains a discussion of selected cases appearing in volumes 335-
345, South Western Reporter, Second Series.
"Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 2 CARR, MISSOURI CIVIL PROCEDURE 549 (1947).
2. Zichler v. St Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 332 Mo. 902, 59 S.W.2d 654 (1933);
Allen v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R., 297 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1956).
3. Huchins v. Southview Golf Club, Inc., 343 S.W.2d 223, 224 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1960).
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In Kornberg v. Getz Exterminators, Inc.4 the plaintiffs hired defendant
exterminators to ply their trade in plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs' petition
alleged that the defendant used "a certain alleged insecticide," the odor
of which remained long after defendant's departure.
Plaintiffs also charged that defendant had "exclusive knowledge as to
the cause of such vile, noxious odors"; that a "proper application" of the
insecticide would have prevented the residual odors; and, further, that
defendant had been "negligent and careless."
The exterminator, believing that a defendant is entitled to know what
"issues" will be presented at the trial, moved for a more definite statement.
The motion was granted by the trial court, but the Supreme Court held
the petition definite enough as originally written.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that defendant made its motion
to force plaintiffs to allege "with particularity what defendant had done
or failed to do." The court excused plaintiff from this duty because "the
effects of the insecticide used by defendant in treating plaintiffs' home,
were peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and were matters
of which plaintiffs could not reasonably be expected to know ... "
Thus the petition was held adequate because it charged "general
negligence with as much particularity as should be expected." (There was
no suggestion that plaintiffs were proceeding on a res ipsa theory. If they
had been, the case would have been easily resolved on that basis.)
The exterminator will now go to trial without knowing what act of
negligence he is charged with or what the issues will be. Plaintiffs will
be allowed to offer proof that defendant used too much insecticide, the
wrong mixture, the right mixture but the wrong application or any other
theory they choose. Defendant is not to be envied its job of preparing
the defense.
Although plaintiffs have been excused at this stage of the litigation
from specifying how defendant was negligent, their relief is probably tem-
porary. Having sued on a theory of negligence, plaintiffs must certainly
do more than prove that when defendant's work ended the redolence lin-
gered on. The prolonged stench may have been unavoidable, or it may
have been produced by some improvident act of the homeowner. Instruc-
tions to the jury must surely hypothesize some particular acts or omissions
and they must require a finding that those acts or omissions amount to
negligence.
4. 341 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. 1961).
19621
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It is respectfully suggested that since plaintiffs must formulate a
theory of liability at some stage of the case, the proper place is in the
petition. If they need more information, adequate time should be allowed
for them to make full use of the discovery devices and to consult their
own expert witnesses before requiring the more definite statement.
The court relied heavily on the broad dictum in Maybaclh v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp.5 which also suggested that the particularity required of a
plaintiff's petition should depend in part on the amount of information
in plaintiff's possession at the time of filing suit. In neither case is there
any suggestion as to the facts which must be hypothesized in the verdict
directing instruction. The Kornberg and Mayback cases both acknowledge
that negligence is the "ultimate fact" to be determined.
The jury can hardly pass on this question without knowing the
particular acts or omissions under attack.
The Kornberg case is a departure from the previously announced prin-
ciple requiring a pleader to "clearly define the issues to be met." The new
doctrine is apt to be difficult to apply and unduly burdensome to de-
fendants.0
B. Contributory Negligence
Illinois requires a plaintiff to plead and prove freedom from con-
tributory negligence.7 This, of course, is contrary to the Missouri rule which
requires defendant to plead and prove plaintiff's contributory negligence.8
When an Illinois cause of action is tried in Missouri, who has the burden
of proof on the issue of contributory negligence? Who must plead the issue?
In 1957 the Missouri Supreme Court "re-examined" the law on the
subject and held that when an Illinois cause of action is tried in Missouri,
plaintiff has the burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence.,
The question of which party must plead the issue was not raised in that
case. This problem arose in Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co.10
The plaintiff, a plumber, was injured when a drain solvent exploded.
5. 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87 (1949). This case was also noted in 16
Mo. L. REv. 76 (1951), wherein it was suggested that the real effect of the de-
cision was to broaden the res ipsa rule.
6. If comparative knowledge is to be the test in pleading, a sleeping passenger
involved in an automobile wreck should likewise be permitted to invoke a charge
of general negligence.
7. Cullen v. Higgins, 216 Ill. 78, 82, 74 N.E. 698, 700 (1905): Hanson v.
Trust Co., 380 Ill. 194, 43 N.E.2d 931 (1942).
8. Mo. R. Crv. P. 55.10.
9. O'Leary v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 299 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
10. 344 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
[Vol. 27
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Plaintiff sued the solvent manufacturer for negligence in not adequately
warning plaintiff of dangers in using the solvent. The injury occurred in
Illinois, but suit was filed in Missouri.
Plaintiff filed his petition before the 1957 "re-examination" I and
failed to allege his own due care. Defendant, following the Missouri practice,
raised the issue of contributory negligence as an affirmative defense in its
answer. At the beginning of the trial "plaintiff asked leave to amend" (pre-
sumably to correct his petition by asserting his own due care). The trial
judge denied the request, but he did permit plaintiff to file a reply in which
plaintiff alleged due care for his own safety.
Defendant in its motion for a directed verdict and an, appeal argued that
plaintiff's petition failed to state a cause of action and that the elements
essential to a cause of action may not be stated in the reply. 2 But plaintiff
was saved because defendant's answer injected the issue, and the court held
that "this cures the omission . . . at least when the reply joins in the
issue .... 113
Did the defendant make a tactical error in supplying the contributory
negligence issue in his answer? The court so implies. Federal decisions deal-
ing with the same problem offered little guidance to counsel because of the
divergence of views expressed.' 4
11. O'Leary v. Illinois Terminal R.R., supra note 9.
12. In Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S.W.2d 571, 575 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931), the
court said: "Plaintiffs must recover, if at all, upon the cause of action stated in
the petition, and, if none is stated, a reply cannot aid the petition." See also
Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, 502, 111 S.W. 475, 479 (1908); Talbert v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry., 314 Mo. 352, 365, 284 S.W. 499, 502 (1926) (en banc); Dreckshage
v. Dreckshage, 352 Mo. 78, 176 S.W.2d 7 (1943).
13. See Conrad v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S.W.2d 438
(K.C. Ct. App 1934), and State ex rel. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Allen, 85 S.W.2d
455, 461 (Mo. 1935).
14. Federal Rule 8(c) also makes contributory negligence an affirmative de-
fense. The problem has arisen in federal diversity of citizenship cases which were
tried in states, such as Illinois, where plaintiffs must plead and prove freedom from
contributory negligence. Under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64(1938), federal courts are required to follow the substantive law of the state in
which they are sitting. Burden of proof on the contributory negligence issue was
held in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), to be a matter of
substantive law. As to who must plead the issue, the federal decisions have not
been consistent. In Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1938), the court
held that plaintiff had the burden of pleading freedom from contributory negligence.
There is dictum in Sampson v. Channell, sutpra, that Rule 8(c) requires defendant
to plead the issue of contributory negligence even though plaintiff has the burden
of proof as a matter of substantive law. In Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117(1943), the United States Supreme Court did little to clarify the area when it
said: "Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of pleading. The question of the burden
of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law. . . ." (Emphasis
1962]
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When cases of this kind are tried in Missouri courts a plaintiff should
clearly allege due care for his own safety. Defendants who are served
with petitions which omit this element will be greatly tempted to sit back
and attack plaintiff's case at the close of his evidence.
C. Counterclaims
In McClellan v. Sam Sckwartz Pontiac, Inw. 15 the Supreme Court held
that a counterclaim was not compulsory in an action begun in the magistrate
court.
Schwartz sold an automobile to McClellan and accepted his note as
part payment. McClellan defaulted and Schwartz filed suit in the magistrate
court for the 519 dollar balance due on the note. McClellan counterclaimed
to recover payments already made on the note, alleging that he was never
able to get title to the car. Although he had made payments of 1,242 dollars,
McClellan limited his counterclaim to 1,000 dollars so as to stay within the
magistrate's jurisdiction.
The magistrate court found for McClellan on Schwartz's claim and
for Schwartz on McClellan's counterclaim. Schwartz then appealed and
the whole action was transferred to the circuit court.16 McClellan promptly
dismissed his counterclaim without prejudice and filed a separate suit in
the circuit court requesting not only the full 1,242 dollars paid on the note,
but also 25,000 dollars in punitive damages. This move was necessary be-
cause when a magistrate action is appealed, the circuit court must hear the
same case which was presented to the magistrate17 This would have limited
McClellan's counterclaim to 1,000 dollars. Since McClellan was faced with a
circuit court suit, there was no longer any reason for limiting his prayer for
damages.
This turn of events induced Schwartz to move for a dismissal of Mc-
Clellan's new lawsuit (complete with prayer for punitive damages) on the
ground that the same issues were being litigated in the case appealed from
the magistrate court. Schwartz also argued that McClellan was splitting
his cause of action by using it as a defense in the appealed case and as
added.) MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 8.27, at 1692 (2d ed. 1948), suggests thatin the federal courts the safest practice is for defendant to plead the issue of
contributory neglience even though plaintiff must prove it as a matter of sub-
stantive law.
15. 338 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1960).
16. § 512.250, RSMo 1959.
17. § 512.280, RSMo 1959.
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the basis for an independent action. The Supreme Court rejected both
arguments and permitted the independent action to continue.'$
With most dockets crowded it is unfortunate to have two independent
trials involving the same transaction and issues. Had McClellan filed his
26,242 dollar counterclaim in the magistrate court within twenty days after
the return date, the whole case would have been sent to the circuit court for
the initial trial.19
Where an appeal from the magistrate action can reasonably be antic-




Garnishments are common occurrences for most large corporations.
Because objections are rarely raised, creditors, garnishees, and serving
officers treat garnishments rather casually, and specific statutory directions
are often ignored. This has its perils.
In Blackburn, Motor Co. v. Benjamin Motor Co.20 plaintiff began an
attachment action against a nonresident defendant. In aid of attachment,
a writ of garnishment was issued and served on Ford Motor Company as
garnishee.
Section 525.050 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (1959) requires
that notice of garnishment shall be served 'on corporations by delivering
notice to "the president, secretary, treasurer, cashier or other chief or
managing officer of such corporation."
For many years it had been the custom of the sheriff and his deputies
to serve garnishment writs by leaving them with the personal secretary of
the Plant Comptroller of Ford Motor Company. This secretary had no
supervisory duties and was in no sense a "managing officer" of Ford. There
18. Section 517.240, RSMo 1959, provides that a defendant "may set off any de-
mand he has against the plaintiff" but it further provides that if the set off or
counterclaim is for an amount in excess of the magistrate's jurisdiction, it shall
be dismissed without prejudice. If such an excessive counterclaim is filed within
twenty days after the return date of the summons, instead of dismissing the
counterclaim, the magistrate is to certify the record to the appropriate circuit
court. In McClellan the court said: "Those provisions indicate that the filing of
such a counterclaim in the magistrate court is not compulsory and that the claim
may be filed in another court is not compulsory and that the claim may be filed
in another court having jurisdiction thereof." McClellan v. Sam Schwartz Pontiac,
Inc., supra note 15, at 53.
19. § 517.240(2), RSMo 1959.
20. 340 S.W.2d 155 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960).
19621
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1962], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
was testimony that Ford never objected to this procedure and in fact made
a practice of responding to such actions as though service had been made
on a proper corporate official.
In the Blackbum case the same custom was followed and the deputy's
return recited that the writ was served on the "secretary to the plant
comptroller."
Although Ford had "never raised any question in the past about the
manner of service of writs of garnishment" an objection was raised in the
case by filing a motion to quash the writ of garnishment.
Plaintiff protested that Ford was now estopped to demand service
on a proper corporate official and that Ford was guilty of laches. Neither
argument was accepted.
The court held that the statute specifies which corporate officials
may be served. The statute must be followed and "no voluntary act of
the garnishee, not in strict compliance with the requirements of the statutes,
can constitute a waiver of the statutory prerequisites."
The doctrine is not new, 21 but it is a timely reminder that serving
officers must penetrate the executive suite and reach one of the officials
designated by the statute.
Attaching creditors are not the only ones who need to watch for full
compliance with the statute. Garnishees who make payment when they
are not properly summoned expose themselves to double liability. Payment
in a garnishment action is a discharge of the garnishee's duty to his creditor
only if the judgment against the garnishee is valid. If service is not on
the proper corporate official, the court does not obtain jurisdiction and the
judgment is void.22
21. C. Rallo Contracting Co. v. Blong, 313 S.W.2d 734 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
There the garnishment notice was served on a bookkeeper who was called a "chief
clerk" in the sheriff's return. Such service was held inadequate to give the court
jurisdiction over the debt sought to be attached.
22. Hedrix v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 103 Mo. App. 40, 43, 77 S.W. 495,
496 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903), expresses the rule as follows: "It devolved upon the
garnishee, not merely as the exercise of a right, but also as a duty, and in self-
protection, to make the defense that the judgment upon which the writ of garnish-
ment was based was void for want of jurisdiction. If the court rendering the originaljudgment had attempted to exercise jurisdiction without any legal foundation, the
whole proceeding was void, and no property or credits of defendant could be
divested through it; and a garnishee voluntarily submitting to judgment for any
amount in his hands belonging to defendant, without interposing the defense of
absence of jurisdiction, would neither be protected in the subsequent payment of
such judgment, nor discharged from the indebtedness as against defendant, who
could be deprived of his property only by due process of law."
[Vol. 27
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B. Actions Against Decedents' Estates
The need for a literal compliance with notice statutes was also demon-
strated in Smith v. Maynard.2 3
Plaintiff sustained injuries while riding as a guest passenger in an
automobile operated by decedent. The accident happened on April 30,
1956. On June 14, 1956, the Probate Court of Warren County, on plaintiff's
application, appointed an administratrix for decedent. The first publication
of the granting of letters was made on July 5, 1956.
Plaintiff filed suit against the administratrix in the Circuit Court of
Warren County on November 19, 1956, or about seven months after the
accident. The administratrix filed an answer to the petition which was in
effect a general denial.
On December 13, 1957, the administratrix delivered the coup de grace.
She moved to dismiss plaintiff's petition because plaintiff had not filed
a copy of her petition and service of process with the Warren County
Probate Court "within nine months after the first published notice of let-
ters testamentary or of administration" as required by statute.24
Plaintiff claimed waiver and estoppel because the point was not raised
when the first responsive pleading was due and because defendant moved
for a change of venue and took depositions in the action.25
The majority opinion held that the plaintiff's claim was completely
barred for failure to comply with the statutory filing requirements. The
dissenting opinion would have permitted plaintiff's case to proceed so long
as she did not attempt to reach assets of decedent's estate. Since decedent
had a liability policy equal to plaintiff's prayer for damages, this would
have permitted plaintiff to recover without touching the decedent's assets
or interfering with the prompt administration of the estate.
III. ARGUMENT
Few pains known to man equal that suffered by a defense attorney
during the plaintiff's final (and unanswerable) argument. The agony
23. 39 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
24. § 473.360, RSMo 1959, as amended in 1959 by S.B. 305.
25. The same general problem was raised in Clarke v. Organ, 329 S.W.2d
670 (Mo. 1959) (en banc). Plaintiff Smith tried to distinguish her case by arguing
that a 1959 amendment to Section 473.060, RSMo 1959, evinced a legislative in-
tent that claims not properly filed would only be barred from recovering out of
the estate. Plaintiff argued that she did not want to make her recovery "out of
any assets being administered," but rather from the decedent's liability insurance
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reaches its peak when plaintiff's counsel raises new matters which could
be answered by defendant except for plaintiff having the last word. To
these sufferers, relief is in sight.
The Canons of Ethics20 provide in part:
It is not candid or fair for the lawyer ... in these jurisdictions
where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his
opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening
argument upon which his side then intends to re[p]ly.27
One of the earliest comments on the proper scope of the plaintiff's
final argument came in 1922.28 Plaintiff and defendant had each been
allotted twenty minutes for their arguments and plaintiff had used twelve
minutes for the first part of his argument. Defendant then waived closing.
The trial court ruled that this brought the case to a close and plaintiff
lost his remaining argument time.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge had not abused his
discretion and commented that:
[T]he purpose of a concluding argument is to answer the argu-
ment by counsel who holds the negative in a given case, and if,
perchance, defendant's counsel declines to argue and waives argu-
ment, plaintiff for the affirmative has nothing to answer. (Emphasis
added.) 2
A somewhat different approach came in a 1940 case.30 Plaintiff had
sued a hotel owner for injuries received from a fall due to defendant's
failure to provide adequate light in the bathroom. Certain pictures of the
bathroom were used in the trial but not mentioned in the first part of
plaintiff's closing argument. Defense counsel objected to the final argument
being based on these pictures.
'The court referred to what is now Rule 4.22 of the Canons of Ethics
and said: "The rule both ethical and procedural is that counsel must not
conceal or withhold 'positions' in his opening argument." The court then
concluded that plaintiff had not concealed a "position" for defendant knew
plaintiff's position to be that the bathroom area was dim and the floor mark-
26. Mo. Sup. Or. RULE 4.22.
27. In a footnote to Votrain v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 268 S.W.2d 838, 845(Mo. 1954) (en banc), the court said: "The last word is 'rely' in the rule as
adopted November 1, 1934.... However, in subsequent pamphlets . . . the word
erroneously appears as 'reply.'"
28. Friedman v. United Rys., 293 Mo. 235, 238 S.W. 1074 (1922).
29. Id. at 247, 238 S.W. at 1077.
30. Cumming v. Allied Hotel Corp., 144 S.W.2d 177 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940).
[Vol. 27
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ings deceptive. The court said: "This was the position taken in the opening
argument and the closing argument."
The term "position" was given a very broad meaning somewhat akin to
a theory of recovery. Such a test is apt to be an inadequate standard.
The problem was raised again in 1954.31 Plaintiff's counsel ended the
first half of his argument by saying that he would like to develop "how we
are going to compensate a man for these lifetime injuries." Defense counsel
then made his closing argument. When plaintiff's counsel commenced the
final portion of his argument he began discussing the nature, extent and
permanency of plaintiff's injuries and requested $85,000.
Defense counsel objected because there had "been no mention of the
amount in the first half of counsel's argument" and the defense had no
opportunity to rebut it. Defendant also asked for a mistrial.
The trial judge instructed the jury to "disregard that particular state-
ment as to the amount" but the request for the mistrial was denied.
On appeal the Supreme Court specifically ruled that Canon 4.22 had
not been violated. The court did say that: "Generally, the purpose of closing
argument by [plaintiff] is to answer the argument of counsel for [de-
fendant] . . . . By custom and better practice, closing arguments should be
in rebuttal." The court also said: "We shall assume without deciding that
the trial judge correctly sustained defendant's objections." This comment
considerably diluted whatever force the opinion might otherwise have had.
Seven years later the same defense counsel raised the same point but
with greater success. In Shaw v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n 32 plaintiff's counsel
confined the first part of his closing argument to the issue of liability and
credibility of witnesses. "He did not, as such, mention the matter of plain-
tiff's injuries or the damages claimed." At the close of the first part of his
argument plaintiff's counsel said that in his concluding (and unanswerable)
argument he had "some other points" that he wanted to develop.
Defense counsel then served notice on plaintiff's counsel before he
stopped the first part of his argument that if he "expects to raise any new
points in his final argument," defendant would object. Defense counsel
added: "If he [plaintiff's counsel] has any damages to argue or anything
else, I would like to have the opportunity to answer them." The trial judge
said simply, "Overruled."
To the surprise of no one, the plaintiff's counsel in his concluding argu-
31. Votrain v. Illinois Terminal R.R., supra note 27.
32. 344 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1961).
1962]
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ment "spent a considerable part of his time in arguing the matter of in-
juries and damages." Defense counsel objected and was overruled.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in allowing closing
argument on injuries and damages and reversed the plaintiff's 20,000 dollar
judgment.
The court refused to "lay down a hard and fast rule governing all
cases, in all their varying circumstances," but the court did say that "the
party having the affirmative of the issues in a suit such as this may not,
after full notice and warning, withhold all arguments on the vital questions
of injuries and damages."
This is a more precise and more workable limitation than trying to de-
termine whether plaintiff has concealed his "position."
Two earlier cases were discussed and distinguished.3 3 In neither case
did defense counsel give the "full and complete warning" given in this case.
Defense lawyers wishing to avail themselves of the protection conferred
by this case should furnish plaintiffs with the same full and complete warn-
ing before beginning their own closing arguments, and they should be care-
ful to object to any violations. They must also avoid waiving their right to
impose this limitation. The court suggested that had defense counsel
touched on the question of damages or injuries in his own argument, the
door would have been open for plaintiff to argue these matters in answer to
the defendant.3 '
IV. APPEALS
Joffe v. Beatrice Foods Co.35 dealt with a question of appellate jurisdic-
tion, but its real significance is the effect it has on the amount of plaintiffs'
ultimate recovery.
Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile, was injured in a collision in-
33. Goldstein v. Fendelman, 336 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1960); Votrain v. Illinois
Terminal R.R., supra note 27.
34. Within a few months after the Shaw case the waiver problem did arise.
In Sullivan v. Hanley, 347 S.W.2d 710 (Spr. Ct. App. 1961), plaintiff ignored the
damage issue in the first part of his argument. Defendant in his argument "did
refer briefly to the testimony that plaintiff's doctor, Gemstetter, stated he saw
plaintiff only a total of thirteen times from the time plaintiff left the hospital." The
court said: "The facts inherent in this case distinguish it from the Shaw case. In
view of defendant's counsel having made some mention of the medical situation,
the trial judge technically was correct in 'his refusal to sustain a general objection
to 'any argument about any injuries.'"
The court also noticed the absence of the advance "warning" given by defend-
ant in the Shaw case.
35. 335 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1960).
[Vol. 27
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volving four different vehicles. Plantiff and his parents filed a 30,000 dollar
suit against the drivers of three of the vehicles and the corporate owner of
the fourth. The four defendants were charged with being joint tortfeasors.
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence the trial judge directed a verdict in
favor of three of the four defendants. The jury returned a 9,500 dollar ver-
dict against the remaining defendant. It may be assumed that the losing de-
fendant had a small liability insurance policy as 5,025 dollars was promptly
paid on the judgment. This reduced the judgment debt to 4,475 dollars.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial complaining that the trial court
had erred in directing verdicts for certain defendants. Plaintiffs did not
complain about the adequacy of the award. After the motion was overruled
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court on the theory that more than
15,000 dollars was in -dispute as the escaping defendants had been sued for
30,000 dollars. The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the case trans-
ferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals because only 4,475 dollars was
in dispute.
The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs' damages had been assessed by
the jury and when no exception was taken concerning the adequacy of
their award, the amount became final, not only as to the losing defendant,
but as to the other three defendants who got out at the close of plaintiffs'
case. So if plaintiffs ultimately get a new trial against the remaining de-
fendants, their maximum recovery will be 4,475 dollars and not the 30,000
dollars prayed for.
Plaintiffs argued, first, that the damages awarded against one defend-
ant should have no limiting effect on their recovery against other defendants
for whom verdicts were directed before the case went to the jury; second,
that dismissing three of the defendants from the case at the close of
plaintiffs' evidence converted the case from one joint action to four separate
actions.
The court rejected both arguments and held that plaintiffs' failure to
complain about the adequacy of the jury award in their new trial motion
amounted to an acceptance that "their total recovery, irrespective of the
number of defendants finally liable was in the sum of $9,500."
There is a certain appeal to plaintiffs' argument that the defendants
who were dismissed at the close of plaintiffs' evidence should not enjoy the
benefits of the low verdict. And plaintiffs can rather logically argue that
there was no point in complaining about the adequacy of an award rendered
against one unable to pay even the inadequate sum assessed.
1962]
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Appealing as these arguments may seem, they run counter to the
principle that when a plaintiff brings one action against two or more joint
tortfeasors, "there must be only one final judgment in the same amount
against all who are held liable." 30 All of the defendants remained in the case
until plaintiffs had completed their proof. Each defendant had an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine plaintiffs' witnesses in an effort to reduce the
amount of recovery. Such defendants receive the benefits and burdens of
the jury's assessment.
Even if the plaintiffs had proceeded separately against one of the joint
tortfeasors, an appeal from the inadequate award might have been necessary.
A judgment, adequate or inadequate, against one of several joint tortfeasors
will, if satisfied,37 discharge the remaining tortfeasors.
The universal rule at common law is that when an injured
party has received full satisfaction for his injury, from one wrong-
doer, whether the injury was caused by one or more, each of whom
may be severally liable, he is barred from further recovery from
the other tortfeasors.38
36. Yarrington v. Lininger, 327 S.W.2d 104, 111 (Mo. 1959).
37. There is some difference of opinion as to whether a plaintiff must accept
satisfaction of a final judgment thus preventing subsequent suits against the other
tortfeasors. In Skelly Oil Co. v. Jordan, 186 Okla. 130, 96 P.2d 524 (1939), and in
Bradford v. Carson, 223 Ala. 594, 137 So. 426 (1931), the plaintiff was permitted
to reject satisfaction of a small judgment obtained against one tortfeasor so as to
proceed against another joint tortfeasor with the hope of a more adequate award.
A contrary result was reached in Collins v. Smith, 255 App. Div. 665, 8 N.Y.S.2d
794 (1939), where the court held that when the losing defendant paid the amount
of the judgment into court such was sufficient to constitute a satisfaction which
would bar suit against another joint torifeasor. For a discussion of this subject
and the related problem of suing out execution against one of several tortfeasors
see Annot., 166 A.L.R. 1099 (1947).
38. Hanson v. Norton, 340 Mo. 1012, 1022, 103 S.W.2d 1, 6 (1937).
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